FRICKER EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE PDF
In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
|Published (Last):||11 March 2004|
|PDF File Size:||7.71 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||14.93 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
With this book Miranda Fricker has opened space for the new meanings the “more squarely political” analysis will require.
Miranda Fricker – Wikipedia
She may make a good case, but prejudice causes the listeners to believe her arguments to be less competent or sincere and thus less believable. Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement “Miranda Fricker’s excellent monograph occupies some relatively uncharted philosophical territory, being ‘neither straightforwardly a work of ethics nor straightforwardly a work of epistemology’, but instead seeking to ‘[renegotiate] a stretch of the border between these two regions’ Nor is virtue conceived in abstraction from the materiality of places, persons, and communities: Ripley as a hysterical female and prompt others to collude in the assessment.
Thus in societies ordered according to hierarchical structures of power and privilege i. It is at once personally and socially damaging.
Views Read Edit View history. To purchase, visit your preferred ebook provider. The implications of variability, even relativity, of there being diverse more or less “just” knowledge claims about fticker same thing”, of this “negative space” as more and other than a space of error or falsity, would preclude its claims to being taken seriously.
The question of who singular or plural determines the colour scheme of this world remains an open one; but there are guidelines at least in the direction of a basic, if tacit, “do no harm” principle, and more actively in the positive role the account accords to the development of a virtuous epistemic “second nature” 85 for which there is a precedent fridker Aristotelian moral philosophy.
Showing how each pattern of conduct passes as matter-of-course within an established social order, the analysis invokes a Foucauldian “metaphysically light” 10 conception of power which, in its agential modality, refers to a social agent or group exercising power over or in relation to another agent or group, in ways that control the other s ‘ actions.
Find it on Scholar. Epistemic Injustice and Illness.
Fricker’s main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. Kusch – – Mind Being Realistic epiwtemic Reasons T.
Kathleen Lennon – – Philosophical Quarterly 59 Ethics of Belief in Epistemology. Gloria Origgi – – Social Epistemology 26 2: In its structural modality it is dispersed through the social order where it operates impersonally, almost imperceptibly, yet surely. In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” viii comes to fruition.
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing – Oxford Scholarship
This page was last edited on 9 Novemberat Testimonial injustice consists in prejudices that cause one to “give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word”: This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged episyemic in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa The Virtue of Testimonial Justice 5.
The analysis centers around a conception of social power which Fricker glosses as “a socially situated capacity to control others’ actions” 4and which manifests in patterns of incredulity, misinterpretation, silencing. Thus, with testimonial injustice, speakers are, variously, thwarted in their claims to injystice as subjects of knowledge, and thereby harmed in their self-development.
An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3: Hence the very idea of epistemic injustice is innovative to the point of initiating a conceptual shift in epistemology as it has traditionally been practiced.
injustcie As the title conveys, Fricker is working in the newly fertile borderland between theories of value and of knowledge. It carries greater explanatory and revisionary force than the social imagination: Federico Luzzi – – Thought: Find it on Scholar. The Aim of Belief Timothy Chan. Michael Brady – – Analysis 69 2: In particular, the book constitutes a striking example of how contemporary epistemology can be enriched by a close attention to our experiences, and of how our understanding of epistemic matters can be deepened through the deployment of ideas from ethics, plitical theory and feminist philosophy.
Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Abstract Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. Hermeneutical Injustice Conclusion Index. Injstice a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but to all of the disciplines.
Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. End Matter Bibliography Index. Because no social imaginary is seamless, in the gaps, the interstices, there is room for dissent to enter once a wave of justice-motivated collective refusal and creative renewal is set in motion.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust. It can also undermine a person in her own conviction that she counts as a possessor or conveyer of knowledge: Rather than viewing them as epistemically-morally-politically pernicious forms of hasty generalization by contrast, say, with Gadamerian pre-judgements or putatively more benign practices of categorization, Fricker argues plausibly for a “neutral” sense of stereotype which catches their frequent reliability as part of a “hearer’s rational resources” in making credibility judgements.